Ethics of Plato and Aristotle: differences and similarities

We can perceive convergences and divergences between Plato’s Ethics and Aristotle’s Ethics. In this text, we seek to expose the main differences and similarities.

Plato’s Ethics

Plato proposes a transcendent ethics, given that the foundation of his ethical proposal is not the empirical reality of the world, not even human conduct or human relations, but the intelligible world. The philosopher centers his inquiries on the perfect, good and fair Idea that organizes society and directs human conduct. Ideas form Platonic reality and are the models according to which men have their values, laws, morals. According to the knowledge of ideas, of essences, man obtains the ethical principles that govern the social world.

The right use of reason is understood as the means of reaching the true values ​​that must be followed by men. In the myth of the cave, the philosopher exposes the condition of ignorance in which man finds himself when dealing with the knowledge of appearances. Only through rational knowledge can man rise to the Ideas, to the Being and know the truth of things. This happens through the dialectical method, which eliminates appearances and finds essences, the truth in the knowledge of things. This philosophical method aims to free men from ignorance and lead them to knowledge from idea to idea, until reaching knowledge of the Supreme Idea: the Good. The other ideas participate in this one and owe their existence to it.

Good illuminates the being with truth, allowing it to be known, just as the Sun illuminates objects and allows them to be seen – here we can see the analogy between Good and Sun presented in the myth of the cave. There are several ideas and it is due to participation in these, even as an imperfect copy, that the sensible world was made possible. When contemplating the idea of ​​Good, man begins to suffer the demands of Being, that is, his actions must be guided according to the contemplated idea.

The human soul – of paramount importance for Platonic ethics- is tripartite, that is, it is formed by intelligence, irascibility and concuspescence. Like the parts of the ideal city, each of the parts of the soul has its own specific functions that cannot be exercised by any of the other parts. Each of the parts of the city and, by analogy, each of the parts of the soul, has its own function which can be performed with excellence or not, and, in performing it with excellence, its own virtue is exercised.

Virtue is defined, therefore, as the ability to perform the task inherent to it. In the case of the ruler of the city and the rational soul, their inherent virtue is wisdom; in the case of warriors and the irascible part of the soul, their own virtue is courage; finally, in the case of the concupiscent part of the soul and the producers of goods in the city, the proper virtue is temperance. Given the position of each class, justice can be defined as each party doing what is theirs, according to their aptitudes. Therefore, by establishing a relationship of analogy between society and the individual, Plato defines the concept of justice – which would also be conceived as a principle of balance between the individual and society – and links it to the concept of virtue.

The feeling of justice is, therefore, the greatest virtue whose ethical value guides the conduct of men. For this virtue to be achieved, man must seek the good in himself, because he realizes the ideal of justice, both with regard to individual and social good.

Platonic ethics deals with the correct way of acting and its relationship with achieving happiness. However, the ethical discourse presented in the Republic about happiness relates this to the concept of justice. The problem of justice fits into the political sphere, which is closely related to the field of ethics: this is how the central thesis arises that only the just person is happy. In the Republic dialogue, seeking the constitution of the ideal city, the core problem arises about the definition of justice so that it could, subsequently, define what justice is both in the individual and in the State. There is, therefore, a parallel between State and individual in order to find the definition of justice.

For Plato, society would be like something organic and well integrated, like a unit built by several independent, although integrated, elements. The city is formed by three classes, as we have already pointed out, and each class has its specific function. It should be noted that such functions are determined according to the natural aptitudes of each member of the city. The purpose of this division is to show more clearly how the same occurs in the human soul. The purpose of the just and good city is, therefore, to promote the happiness of the individual by enabling the practice of their virtues, their specific aptitudes.

We must bear in mind that the virtue corresponding to each class of the city and each part of the human soul must be taught with a view to realizing the ideal of the polis. This education is based on the ascending dialectical method, which frees man from the senses and elevates him to the intelligible world, to the clearest point of Being, the idea of ​​Good. After contemplating the Good directly, the philosopher must return to the city that provided him with an education in order to guide other citizens from ignorance to rational knowledge.

Ideas – from which sensible copies originate – are, therefore, existing in and of themselves, they are universal, eternal, immutable realities. For these reasons, they are the models to be followed, they are paradigms for the construction of the ideal city and for the moral, political and spiritual education of man. Furthermore, they are orderers of the cosmos.

It is evident that Plato’s proposal is linked, mainly, to the ideas of Justice and Good – the latter is the supreme value that sustains justice in relation to political organization and individual conduct. The balance between the three component parts of the soul and the city generates balance, harmony and leads to happiness. Thus, Plato searches for general, universal, immutable, eternal, self-existing definitions: the Ideas. As we will see later, such a search is opposed to the Aristotelian search for virtue linked to its applicability.

Aristotle’s Ethics

Buy it here – Ethics to Nicomachus – Aristotle

Aristotle’s ethics, as opposed to his master’s ethics, is immanent, having its bases in the empirical reality of the world, in the questioning of human conduct and in social organization. The requirements regarding life in the polis and the reality of man form the content of ideas, and are both responsible for the choice of values, for morality and laws, for the definition of men’s conduct. His ethical theory was a realist, empiricist counterpart to Plato’s idealist and rationalist view.

Aristotelian ethics begins with the establishment of the notion of happiness. In this sense, it can be considered eudemonist for seeking what it is to act well on a human scale, to act according to virtue – unlike Plato, who sought the essence of the ideas of happiness and the idea of ​​Good without relating them directly to practice. Happiness is defined as a certain activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue. Based on this definition, it is necessary to study what a perfect virtue is and, thus, it is also necessary to study the nature of moral virtue.

Virtue is defined by the Stagirite as a habit or constant rational disposition, virtue being the habit that makes man good and enables him to perform his function well. This definition is the opposite of Plato’s: virtue is defined as the ability to perform a specific function, inherent in some part of the human soul or the ideal city.

Moral virtue consists of a measure relative to us and the philosopher defines it as a disposition – since they cannot be either faculties or passions – to act deliberately, the disposition being in accordance with right reason. After establishing moral virtue as a disposition – hexis – that is, how man behaves in relation to emotions, there is still a need for the specific difference between moral virtue and intellectual virtue to be made explicit. The Stagirite, in contrast to the views of Socrates and Plato, assigns an important role to feelings in the ethical sphere, as this emotional part of the soul is also responsible for the formation of virtues, when in accordance with the rational part.

What distinguishes the two kinds of virtue is the mean. Intellectual virtue is acquired through teaching, and thus needs experience and time. Moral virtue is acquired, in turn, as a result of habit. Habit determines our behavior as good or bad. It is due to habit that we take the right measure with respect to ourselves. Therefore, the average is imposed by reason in relation to the emotions and is relative to the circumstances in which the action takes place.

None of the moral virtues arises in men by nature – contrary to the Platonic innatist view – because what is by nature cannot be altered by habit, nature enables us to receive such virtues and this capacity to receive them is perfected by habit. Virtues and arts are acquired by exercise, that is, the practice of virtues is a prerequisite for acquiring them. Without practice, there is no possibility for man to be good, to be virtuous.

At this point in Aristotle’s exposition, we can notice another opposition in relation to Platonic ethics: according to this, man can only be good and virtuous by contemplating the idea of ​​Good – which points to the difference between the idealist/rationalist conceptions presented by Plato and the realist/empiricist conceptions expounded by the peripatetic. Aristotle criticizes the identification made by his master between virtue and knowledge, so that knowing the essence of Justice would imply being fair, given that they are identified. Thus, knowledge of the idea of ​​the Good would be the condition for acting well, and virtue would consist of only one type of theoretical knowledge, according to the criticism made by the Stagirite. This states that reason is not the only one to act in determining good conduct, one should take into account the feelings for helping in the formation of virtues, in addition to the fact that virtues imply a rational activity.

As we have seen, the moral virtues are seen as a product of habit, consequently they are not taken as innate – as Socrates and Plato did. By considering the moral virtues as acquired, there is an implication that man is the cause of his own actions, responsible for his character – for this reason action precedes and prevails over disposition – which refutes the Platonic idea that the man who acts badly, does it out of ignorance, because evil is the absence of good. It is in the nature of the virtues the possibility of being destroyed by lack or excess and it is up to the average to preserve the moral virtues and also differentiate them from the natural virtues. It can be noted, therefore, that the idea of…