The horizon of understanding in Gadamer

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) was a 20th-century German philosopher who profoundly impacted Western thought with the publication of his work Truth and Method (1960). In this work, a philosophical hermeneutics is elaborated by the philosopher, but we must bear in mind that Martin Heidegger had a great influence on Gadamer’s thought by bringing historicity to his reflections, that is, by presenting a “hermeneutics of facticity” that turns to to the investigation of the basic structures of factual existence.

We aim to expose, in general, the perspective of Gadamerian hermeneutics, as well as the centrality, definition and status of the concept of “understanding horizon” in relation to it. Other concepts are also approached with a little more attention, such as: language, understanding, dialogue, phronesis.

Time is conceived by Gadamer (under the influence of Heideggerian thought) as “the horizon of all understanding, all theories must inevitably become historical formations, and this will affect the core of reason” (STEIN, 1996, p. 1) . Comprehension is dependent and situated according to our historical condition and the object is understood by its unveiling during its giving itself to us. It is in this very act that we understand each other.

Understanding takes place, therefore, within a situation in which we were already involved, namely, the historical background – given that understanding is an effect of history. Therefore, Gadamerian thought defines the term “understanding horizon” as a representative of the set of concepts and beliefs that we have or that are erected by us in our relationship and understanding of the world: there is no way to strip ourselves of our experiences, of our prejudices and pre-understandings, this horizon of understanding being crucial to human existence and the interpretation and understanding of the object.

The concept of “understanding horizon” also points in the direction of recovering the importance of tradition and authority in understanding the object, refuting the radical Enlightenment criticism of both. Our historical experience brings together understanding and interpretation. The historical experience is, therefore, responsible for raising our horizon of understanding as we extend our awareness of what lies beyond what is already familiar to us. Gadamer explains that:

“The concept of horizon must be retained here because it expresses the high range of vision that anyone who understands must have. Acquiring a horizon means always learning to see beyond what is close, too close, not to look away, but to see better, in a wider set and in fairer proportions” (GADAMER, 1997, p. 327).

The concept of horizon of understanding assumes the status, therefore, of starting point for understanding and interpretation according to the determination of the historical situation. Therefore, its crucial function in hermeneutics is linked to extremely important concepts, such as dialogue, language, understanding and fusion of horizons – which will be explained and related later. It is from this horizon of understanding that we depart towards the object, through our prejudices that will be checked in the clash with the object. This concept is linked to the facticity of man as a being in the world, as existing and active in the endless construction of history.

By being aware that your own being is affected by history, you arrive at hermeneutic awareness. The act of being aware of the effect of history is called “awareness of the historical effect”, which is the self-knowledge entailed by the hermeneutic situation. In this sense, historiography must be understood existentially, as unfinished, in relation to the active role of man as a participant in history and the incessant movement of history. Man belongs, therefore, to a historical reality, which makes his vision of the world and his possibility of knowledge depart from the prejudices that surround him. As sources of pre-understanding, we have elements of authority and tradition.

When man is aware of being inserted in this horizon, understanding is dynamic, as it changes in the act of negotiation between himself and the object understood. The horizon of understanding guides us in relation to praxis (that is why hermeneutics is seen as a guide to praxis, as will be explained later) in the face of what we already understand and what we seek to understand, it tells us how to act and interpret and understanding the object – which can also be taken as one of the functions of this concept in the face of Gadamerian hermeneutics.

Bearing in mind that the absolute truth cannot be absorbed due to the fact that the world does not fully reveal itself, the concept of empathy is of paramount importance: it points to the need to merge different horizons of understanding so that the knowledge of the parties involved is increased, and that both parties are directed towards a new truth, the level of which is higher, though not definitive.

There is, therefore, the need to meet the other so that understanding is shared and for the level of understanding to be expanded, so that it is reformatted, improved, restructured. Thus, understanding requires a fusion of horizons and is linked to the creation of a new context of meaning: it is in this context that the reunion between what was previously familiar and what was previously strange occurs. As a consequence, understanding is conceived as a process of mediation and dialogue between what is familiar and what is strange. This process of involving horizons is permanent. The horizon is, as Gadamer defines it:

“The range of vision that encompasses and encloses everything that is visible from a given point. 🇧🇷 Philosophical language has used this word, especially since Nietzsche and Husserl, to characterize the connection of thought to its finite determinateness and to characterize, with this, the law of the advance of expansion of the visual scope. He who does not have a horizon is a man who does not see far enough and who therefore overestimates what is closest to him. On the contrary, having horizons means not being limited to what is nearest, but being able to see beyond that. He who has horizons knows how to value correctly the meaning of all the things that fall within them, according to the standards of near and far, big and small. The elaboration of the hermeneutic situation then means obtaining the correct questioning horizon for the questions that arise in relation to tradition” (GADAMER, 1997, p. 452).

Understanding and the search for truth happen according to our expectations of meaning from our tradition – which subjects us and enables understanding. It is also noted the importance of merging horizons of understanding so that there is dialogue with the other.

The dialogic point of view assumed by the thinker is based on elements of Aristotle’s theory and elements of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. As a goal, he has the rejection of relativism and subjectivism.

Hermeneutics had its scope of action expanded with the Gadamerian conception that the human being is an interpretive being. This implies that hermeneutics is fixed as an expression of man’s being, seeking a philosophical hermeneutics that aims to provide a basis for understanding. The basic characteristics of the Gadamerian hermeneutic approach lead to the conclusion that language is a medium of all human hermeneutic experience.

“Every formulation of meaning that man performs is circumscribed by the world of language” (SANTOS, 2013, p. 96). This is justified by the vision of language as a meaning of the world and how to bring the beings that make up this world to speech. Language is also responsible for expressing the fundamental relationship between man and the world, given that the world is represented in it.

The encounter between I and the world takes place on the level of language, and this is how understanding takes place: on this linguistic level, man can understand the other and himself. Such an understanding has dialogue as the most appropriate form; Dialogue is therefore composed of speaking and letting speak, asking and answering, which guarantees that the other is not annulled and so that he does not self-annul before the other. Therefore, this implies that an agreement is formed, that is, a common horizon.

Gadamer proposes that practical wisdom (phronesis) can be achieved through the hermeneutics of philosophy due to the fact that the conditions for the most correct deliberation of man and life according to the ethical requirement of openness and also of respect for otherness are linked to hermeneutics: better interpret reality and reach a common language with others.

In this way, it is “Only in the hermeneutic experience of continuous openness to dialogue and common experience that it becomes possible to reorient man in his practical action, leading him to understand himself and the other” (SANTOS, 2013, p. 94) . It is on phronesis that the philosopher bases, therefore, his notions of “understanding” and “interpretation”. This practical wisdom is always linked to the particular case at hand.

Gadamer relates the concepts of Platonic dialogy and Aristotelian practical wisdom to start his construction of a philosophical hermeneutics, as will be explained in the next paragraphs – in which we will also point out the relevance of language for Gadamerian hermeneutics as a whole.

The foundations of hermeneutics lead Gadamer to note the necessary mediation of language, and, concomitantly, lead him to conclude two central points. The first point refers to language as a meaning of the world, given that it is an existential function of man “while being aware of his being in the world” (SANTOS, 2013, p. 89).

The second point refers to the assertion that hermeneutic realization occurs through the encounter of language before an agreement, that is, a common logos. In this meeting, the maximum expression of dialogue takes place. It is at this moment that a new horizon is opened to the existing one.

It is clear in this author’s thought the concern with the approximation of the other, in his otherness. The realization of this approximation takes place in dialogue, and it is in this, therefore, that the sought meaning is improved. The philosopher points out the interpretative posture as a “finding oneself”, which occurs in the openness to the otherness of the thing that one intends to understand.

Thus, the hermeneutic experience is better expressed in language assumed in dialogic form. Therefore, what is sought is the construction of a common space in which the being manifests itself and can be interpreted by man through his conceptual apparatus. The encounter between man and beings happens with their coming-to-speak: it is in the dialogic space that agreement must be sought.

The conception of language as dialogue is structured in the question-answer logic. It is the dialogue that gives greater freedom to the interlocutors and a greater chance that the entity will come to speak in its being. Here is the dialogue happening:

It is part of every true conversation the…